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Organizations crucially need the creative talent of millennials but are reluctant to hire
them because of their supposed lack of diligence. Recent studies have shown that
hiring diligent millennials requires selecting those who score high on the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT) and thus rely on effortful thinking rather than intuition. A central
question is to assess whether the push for recruiting diligent millennials using criteria
such as cognitive reflection can ultimately hamper the recruitment of creative workers.
To answer this question, we study the relationship betweenmillennials’ creativity and their
performance on fluid intelligence (Raven) and cognitive reflection (CRT) tests. The good
news for recruiters is that we report, in line with previous research, evidence of a positive
relationship of fluid intelligence, and to a lesser extent cognitive reflection, with convergent
creative thinking. In addition, we observe a positive effect of fluid intelligence on originality
and elaboration measures of divergent creative thinking. The bad news for recruiters is
the inverted U-shape relationship between cognitive reflection and fluency and flexibility
measures of divergent creative thinking. This suggests that thinking too much may hinder
important dimensions of creative thinking. Diligent and creative workers may thus be a
rare find.
Keywords: creativity, cognitive reflection, intelligence, cognition, intuition
INTRODUCTION
Evidence from a recent survey reports that managers are three times more likely to hire a mature
worker than to hire a millennial (born between 1980 and 2000; Rainer and Rainer, 2011) despite
desperately needing their creative talent1. Mature workers are appealing to recruiters because they
are seen as more reliable and more committed than millennials. The dilemma for managers is thus
to hire millennials that are both diligent and creative.
Recent studies have shown that firms can secure the hiring of diligent millennials by relying on
measures of cognitive skills. For example, intelligence has been found to be the main predictor of
overall work performance in a wide variety of occupations and across age and gender (e.g., Hunter
and Hunter, 1984; Olea and Ree, 1994; see Schmidt, 2009 for a review). Standard measures of
cognitive ability have been found to correlate positively with task performance (Schmidt et al., 1986;
Murphy, 1989) and negatively with counterproductive work behaviors such as theft or absenteeism
1See the following press release: http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2012/09/24/older-workers-theres-hope-study-
finds-employers-like-you-better-than-millennials/#1f5799cb4aa6 (accessed September 21, 2016).
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(Dilchert et al., 2007). Moreover, the results of a recent study
suggest that these effects may be mediated by individuals’
cognitive styles (Corgnet et al., 2015b). In particular, Corgnet
et al. (2015b) find that millennials characterized by a more
reflective style (as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test;
Frederick, 2005) are more diligent, displaying higher levels of
task performance and lower levels of counterproductive work
behaviors2. A crucial caveat is whether hiring millennials based
on cognitive measures may ultimately select less creative workers.
To address this point we need to assess the relationship between
cognitive skills and creativity.
Traditionally, intelligence, and creativity have been
considered to be unrelated (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Wallach
and Kogan, 1965; Batey and Furnham, 2006; Sawyer, 2006;
Weisberg, 2006; Runco, 2007; Kaufman, 2009; Kim et al., 2010).
In a meta-analysis, Kim (2005) finds that the correlation between
creativity test scores and IQ varies widely and is, on average,
small (r = 0.174).
However, a growing consensus has emerged in recent
research stressing a close relationship between intelligence and
creative performance (see Silvia, 2015, for a review). This
emerging consensus heavily relies on recent studies that have
employed more sophisticated statistical techniques and more
robust assessment methods than prior research on the topic.
For example, the use of latent variable models has allowed
researchers to uncover a positive and significant relationship
between creativity and intelligence using data from previous
studies that reported non-significant correlations (Silvia, 2008b).
The recent wave of research on intelligence and creativity has
also improved upon traditional assessment of creativity that
exclusively relied on scoring methods based on the originality
and uniqueness of responses in creative tasks (such as finding
unusual uses for an object). These traditional scoring methods
are imprecise because they confound several factors, such as
fluency and sample size (Hocevar, 1979; Silvia et al., 2008), and
can thus lead to inaccurate estimates of the relationship between
intelligence and creativity (Silvia, 2008a; Nusbaum and Silvia,
2011). The results of this new wave of research on creativity and
intelligence have been taken as evidence that executive cognition
is undoubtedly beneficial to creative thinking (Silvia, 2015).
Yet, although there is an obvious link between intelligence
and executive cognition, from the point of view of modern
dual-process theory (Evans, 2008, 2009; Stanovich, 2009, 2010;
Evans and Stanovich, 2013), one should distinguish between
algorithmic and reflective cognitive processes. Algorithmic
processes are typically associated with computational efficiency
and are measured by standard intelligence tests whereas reflective
processing is associated with a disposition to employ the
resources of the algorithmic mind, that is, to switch from
autonomous “Type 1” thought to analytic “Type 2” (working
memory-dependent) thought. The reflective mind thus has
2Positive effects of cognitive reflection on people’s willingness to choose socially-
efficient resource allocations (Lohse, 2016; Capraro et al., 2016) as well as to trust
strangers (Corgnet et al., 2016) suggest other possible channels through which
organizations may benefit from hiring individuals with a more reflective cognitive
style. Cognitive reflection has also been found to play a key role in moral judgment
(e.g., Paxton et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014).
a disposition-based definition (“cognitive styles”, reflective
vs. intuitive) and is not adequately measured by standard
intelligence tests (which assess “cognitive ability”) but by tasks
of cognitive reflection like the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005). Individuals characterized by a more reflective
mind tend to show higher levels of self-control and lower
levels of “cognitive impulsivity” (Frederick, 2005; Kahneman and
Frederick, 2007; Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Oechssler et al., 2009;
Toplak et al., 2011; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012).
From this perspective, one can conjecture that cognitive
reflection may relate negatively to creativity. This is the case
because a number of studies suggest that the capacity to control
one’s attention and behavior may even be detrimental for creative
thinking (for a review, seeWiley and Jarosz, 2012a). For example,
creative problem solving has been shown to relate positively
to moderate alcohol intoxication (Jarosz et al., 2012), which is
known to impair inhibition and attentional control (Peterson
et al., 1990; Kovacevic et al., 2012; Marinkovic et al., 2012).
Similarly, an “experiential” thinking style (whichmaps onto Type
1 processing) has been found to correlate positively with creative
performance (Norris and Epstein, 2011).
As mentioned, past literature arrived at conflicting
conclusions regarding whether executive cognition favors
(e.g., Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011; Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Silvia,
2015) or hampers (e.g., Eysenck, 1993; Kim et al., 2007; Ricks
et al., 2007; Norris and Epstein, 2011; Jarosz et al., 2012; Wiley
and Jarosz, 2012b) creative thinking. Dual-process theory can
reconcile these apparently conflicting findings by positing that
creativity may be generated by a mix of Type 1 and Type 2
processes (Allen and Thomas, 2011; Ball et al., 2015; Barr et al.,
2015; see Sowden et al., 2015, for a review). It follows that the
dual-process approach lays out a promising research agenda
based on assessing the exact mix of Type 1 and Type 2 processes
that bolsters creativity as well as analyzing separately the effect
of algorithmic and reflective Type 2 processes on creative
thinking.
Following a dual-process approach, Barr et al. (2015) find
experimental evidence of an important effect of controlled Type
2 analytic processes on both convergent and divergent (Guilford,
1967) creative thinking. In particular, they find that both
cognitive ability (measured as the combination of numeracy and
verbal skills) and reflective cognitive style (average of scores in
the CRT and base-rate problem tasks) covary positively with one’s
capacity to make remote associations, that is, with convergent
creative thinking. Regarding divergent creative thinking, Barr
et al. (2015) show that cognitive ability but not cognitive
reflection predicts higher originality scores in an alternate uses
task. Fluency in the latter task, however, was not correlated with
either cognitive measure.
In this paper, we use a similar approach to Barr et al.
(2015) and investigate how both types of cognitive processes
affect creativity. In particular, we analyze how cognitive abilities
(measured using Raven as a test of fluid intelligence) and
cognitive styles (intuitive vs. reflective; as measured by the
CRT) relate to convergent and divergent creative thinking.
We extend Barr et al. (2015) by analyzing other measures
of divergent thinking such as flexibility and elaboration and
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by exploring possible non-linearities between creativity and
cognitive measures.
Given the conflicting results regarding whether executive
cognition is beneficial or detrimental for creative thinking,
we conjecture that there might exist a non-linear relationship
between different measures of creativity and cognition.
Specifically, it might be that a minimum level of executive
cognition is necessary for creative performance but, beyond some
level, the relationship disappears or even turns negative. This
might explain why previous findings seem to be inconsistent.
A related line of reasoning has been proposed in the so-
called “threshold hypothesis” of the relationship between
IQ and creativity (Guilford, 1967; Jauk et al., 2013). The
threshold hypothesis states that intelligence is positively related
to creative thinking for low IQ levels but the relationship
blurs for high IQ levels. Similar arguments arise in recent
accounts of the “mad genius hypothesis”: moderate levels of
inhibitory or top-down control dysfunction, characteristic
of subclinical psychiatric populations (e.g., mild ADHD and
schizophrenia disorders), can spur creativity under some
conditions whereas clinical-severe levels typically lead to
impoverished creative thinking (Schuldberg, 2005; Abraham
et al., 2007; Jaracz et al., 2012; Acar and Sen, 2013; Abraham,
2014).
METHODS
Participants and General Protocol
Participants were 150 students (46.67% female; age: mean ± SD
= 20.23 ± 1.96) from Chapman University in the U.S. These
participants were recruited from a database of more than 2000
students. Invitations to participate in the current study were sent
to a random subset of the whole database. This study is part of
a larger research program on cognition and economic decision
making. The local Institutional Review Board approved of this
research. All participants provided written informed consent
prior to participating. We conducted a total of 12 sessions, nine
had 12 participants and three had 14 participants. On average,
sessions lasted for 45 min. All subjects completed the same tasks
in the following order: (1) CRT, (2) Raven test, (3) Remote
associates task, (4) Alternate uses task. Subjects had 6 min to
complete each task and a 2-min break after completing the Raven
test.
Measures
Cognitive Ability Assessment
Participants completed a subset of Raven progressive matrices
test (Raven, 1936). Specifically, we used the odd number of the
last three series of matrices (Jaeggi et al., 2010; Corgnet et al.,
2015a). The number of matrices correctly solved in the Raven test
(in our sample, ranging from 9 to 18, mean± SD= 14.40± 2.42
for males and 14.47± 2.16 for females) is a conventional measure
of cognitive ability. This test captures an important aspect of
cognitive processing which is referred to as fluid intelligence
and is closely related to algorithmic thinking (Stanovich, 2009,
2010).
Cognitive Style Assessment
We measured the participants’ tendency to rely on intuition vs.
reflection using the CRT introduced by Frederick (2005). The
test is characterized by the existence of an incorrect response
which automatically comes to mind but has to be overridden in
order to find the correct solution. To the original CRT questions,
we added four questions recently developed by Toplak et al.
(2014). This extended task (see Text S1) will allow us to uncover
potentially non-linear relationships that would be hard to observe
using the classical three-item task (Frederick, 2005). In Table S1,
we display the proportion of subjects answering each question
correctly, split by gender. As expected, males performed better
in the test than females (Frederick, 2005; Bosch-Domènech et al.,
2014). Our measure of cognitive reflection is given by the total
number of correct answers (from 0 to 7). The full distribution of
correct answers by males (mean± SD= 4.09± 2.31) and females
(mean± SD= 2.89± 2.03) is provided in Figure S1.
Convergent Creative Thinking
We used a subset of the Remote Associate Test (RAT; Mednick,
1962) to measure subjects’ ability to make remote associations.
In particular, subjects were shown 13 sets of three words (e.g.,
widow-bite-monkey) and asked to find a word which relates to
all the three words provided (in this example the solution is
“spider”). Our measure of convergent thinking is the number of
problems correctly solved (from 0 to 13).
Divergent Creative Thinking
We measured divergent thinking using a variant of the Alternate
Uses Task (AUT; Guilford, 1967). Participants were instructed
to provide as many unusual uses of a pen as possible during 6
min. We construct four different measures of divergent thinking:
fluency, originality, flexibility, and elaboration. We measured
fluency as the total number of answers provided by a participant.
Three raters were presented with a random list of answers and
asked to score the degree of originality of each entry using
a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) Likert scale. We computed
originality as the sum of the average score of the three raters
for all the entries provided by a participant, divided by the total
number of answers. Following Troyer and Moscovitch (2006)
and Gilhooly et al. (2007), all the answers were classified in
broad differentiated categories (e.g., uses of the pen as cloth or
hair accessories). Then, flexibility was measured as the number
of different categories provided by each participant. Finally,
elaboration refers to the average amount of detail (from 0 to 2)
provided by each participant.
Statistical Analysis
For the data analysis, we start by showing the descriptive statistics
of all the measures used and their zero-order correlations. To
further assess the relationships between creativity and cognitive
measures, we first provide a graphical representation using
LOWESS smoothing (Cleveland, 1979; Cleveland and McGill,
1985). We then run ordinary least squares regressions which
allow us to test the statistical significance of the linear and non-
linear relationships which were shown in the LOWESS graphs.
All the analyses were performed using Stata 14.0.
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RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Means, standard deviations, and correlations are shown in
Table 1. Unsurprisingly, we find moderate positive correlation
between the number of correct answers in the CRT and Raven
tests (r = 0.26, p < 0.01) which suggests that CRT and Raven
are not entirely measuring the same cognitive skills (Frederick,
2005; Stanovich, 2009, 2010). Similarly, the different measures
of divergent thinking (AUT) are significantly correlated (all
p’s < 0.01), except for originality and flexibility (p= 0.28).
Regarding our cognitive measures, we find that both Raven
(p < 0.01) and CRT scores (p = 0.03) are positively correlated
with convergent thinking (RAT). However, the relationship
between cognitive skills and divergent thinking is more
complicated. High levels of cognitive ability (Raven) relate
positively with originality (p = 0.01) and elaboration (p < 0.01),
but negatively with the number of answers provided (fluency; p=
0.04) and non-correlated with flexibility (p= 0.20). Finally, we do
not find a significant correlation between cognitive styles (CRT
scores) and any measure of divergent thinking (all p’s > 0.26).
Non-linear Effects and Regression Analysis
We now turn to the study of possible non-linear relationships
between our measures of cognition and creativity. Figure 1
displays all the relationships under study using LOWESS
(bandwidth= 0.8; Cleveland, 1979; Cleveland andMcGill, 1985).
LOWESS is a model-free smoothing technique based on locally-
weighted regressions which can detect both linear and non-
linear relationships. In order to compare the effect sizes, we
standardize all measures (standard deviations from the mean).
We also ran ordinary least squares regressions to assess the
statistical significance of the observed relationships. In Tables
S2–S6, we present the results of a series of regressions in
which we estimated both linear and quadratic effects of each of
the predictors (Raven and CRT) separately on each creativity
measure (columns [1] to [4]). From these regressions, we selected
the models with the best fit, either linear or quadratic in
each case, using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
report them in summary Table 2. In addition, we ran similar
regressions in which both predictors (linear and quadratic terms)
are included simultaneously (columns [5] and [6] in Tables
S2–S6) in order to test for possible mediation or confounding
effects. The interaction between CRT and Raven scores is
never significant in predicting creativity (all p’s > 0.3) and is
thus not reported in the tables for the sake of brevity. The
results remain qualitatively similar if we also control for gender
and age.
The models with the best fit (Table 2) report a positive linear
relationship of convergent thinking (RAT) with both Raven
(p < 0.01) and CRT scores (p = 0.03), which is consistent with
the positive and significant correlations reported in the previous
section. Effect sizes are substantial: in both cases, one SD increase
in the predictor is associated with about 20% of one SD increase
in RAT (0.22 and 0.17 for Raven and CRT, respectively; see
coefficients in Table 2). Interestingly, the effect of Raven on RAT
remains significant (p= 0.02) if we include both Raven and CRT
scores as predictors (see column [5] in Table S2) whereas the
effect of CRT becomes non-significant (p = 0.15). This result
suggests that the significant effect of CRT scores on convergent
thinking is driven more by cognitive ability (basic computational
skills are also necessary for solving the CRT correctly) rather than
by reflectiveness.
The relationship between our cognitive measures and
divergent thinking is more complex. The models with the best
fit report a linear and significant relationship between cognitive
ability and all the measures of divergent thinking (all p’s < 0.03),
except for flexibility (p = 0.22; see Table 2). Subjects with a
higher Raven score tend to generate less uses (lower fluency),
although these are more elaborated and original. Again, for these
three creativity measures, one SD increase in Raven produces a
variation in the dependent variable of about 20% of one SD. The
effect of Raven on flexibility appears to be slightly U-shaped in
Figure 1 but the regressions do not report any significant linear
or quadratic relationship (all p’s > 0.22; see columns [1] and
[2] in Table S5). As shown in columns [5] and [6] of Tables
S3–S6, the effect of Raven on the divergent thinking measures
remains virtually identical when controlling for CRT, which
indicates that cognitive reflection does not mediate any of these
relationships.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations.
Mean Std Dev [1] [2] [3] [4a] [4b] [4c] [4d]
COGNITIVE MEASURES
1. Raven 14.43 2.30 –
2. CRT 3.53 2.26 0.26** –
CREATIVITY
3. RAT 3.69 2.97 0.23** 0.17* –
4. AUT
4.a. Originality 1.33 0.54 0.20* 0.09 0.14 –
4.b. Fluency 16.47 8.90 −0.17* −0.06 −0.06 −0.25** –
4.c. Flexibility 11.17 4.22 −0.10 −0.01 −0.02 −0.09 0.85*** −
4.d. Elaboration 0.23 0.29 0.26** 0.06 0.10 0.37*** −0.36*** −0.31*** −
N = 150, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 1 | Relationship between cognitive measures and creative thinking. The relationships are represented using locally weighted smoothing (LOWESS)
techniques. All variables are standardized.
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TABLE 2 | The effect of cognitive abilities and cognitive styles on creativity (best fitting models).
RAT AUT Originality AUT Fluency AUT Flexibility AUT Elaboration
[Raven] [CRT] [Raven] [CRT] [Raven] [CRT] [Raven] [CRT] [Raven] [CRT]
Ravenstd 0.219*** 0.195*** −0.162** −0.099 0.246***
(0.076) (0.071) (0.074) (0.081) (0.067)
Raven2std
CRTstd 0.169** 0.089 −0.043 0.011 0.053
(0.076) (0.082) (0.066) (0.073) (0.082)
CRT2std −0.207*** −0.194**
(0.076) (0.079)
Constant 0.001 −0.010 0.001 −0.005 −0.001 0.224 −0.001 0.206 0.001 −0.003
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.136) (0.082) (0.127) (0.079) (0.082)
F 8.229 4.891 7.562 1.179 4.732 4.255 1.490 2.990 13.302 0.420
prob > F 0.005 0.029 0.007 0.279 0.031 0.016 0.224 0.053 0.000 0.518
R2 0.053 0.030 0.042 0.008 0.029 0.039 0.011 0.031 0.067 0.003
Ll −208.277 −210.018 −209.129 −211.706 −210.139 −209.359 −211.522 −210.000 −207.174 −212.112
AIC 420.555 424.036 422.258 427.411 424.278 424.717 427.044 426.000 418.348 428.225
OLS estimates. N = 150. All variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. See Tables S2–S6 for alternative specifications. *p < 0.05, **p <0.01, ***p
<0.001.
Contrary to the results observed with Raven, we do not find
any significant linear relationship between cognitive styles and
divergent thinking (all p’s > 0.28; see column [3] in Tables S3–
S6). These results hold when we control for Raven (all p’s > 0.63;
see column [5] in Tables S3–S6). However, we find a significant
inverted U-shape relationship of CRT with both fluency and
flexibility, as reported in Table 2 (p < 0.01 and p = 0.02,
respectively). Subjects with an average level of cognitive reflection
tend to produce more answers and use more categories than
those subjects characterized by either a more intuitive or a more
reflective cognitive style. Moreover, the fact that the coefficient
of the linear term in the quadratic regression specification is not
significantly different from zero in either case (p = 0.52 and p =
0.88, respectively) indicates that the maximum levels of fluency
and flexibility are observed at the mean CRT score, as suggested
by Figure 1. Effect sizes are comparable to those reported above
insofar as, in both cases, moving one SD either above or below
the mean CRT is associated with a decrease of about 20% of
one SD in the dependent variable. Yet, the effects are larger for
more extreme CRT values. Note that half of the observations
fall outside the range mean ± one SD (see also Figure S1).
Controlling for Raven does not alter these relationships (p= 0.01
and p= 0.02, respectively; see column [6] in Tables S4, S5), which
again indicates an absence of mediation effects.
DISCUSSION
The dual-process approach of cognition has been recently
suggested to reconcile previous conflictive findings on the
relationship between creativity and executive cognition (Allen
and Thomas, 2011; Ball et al., 2015; Barr et al., 2015;
Sowden et al., 2015). We contribute to this literature by
differentiating between the algorithmic and reflective minds
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013), and by analyzing their separate
effects on convergent thinking and four different dimensions
of divergent thinking. We partially replicate the results of
Barr et al. (2015) by finding that individuals’ ability to make
remote associations correlates positively with cognitive ability
and cognitive reflection. However, we find that this effect
on convergent thinking is mainly driven by cognitive ability.
Similarly to Barr et al. (2015), we also find that higher levels of
cognitive ability are related with higher originality scores and
lower fluency scores in divergent thinking. Unlike Barr et al.
(2015), we also analyze non-linear effects and find an inverted U-
shape relationship between cognitive reflection and our measures
of flexibility and fluency on the divergent thinking task. These
new results suggest that individuals who are highly deliberative
may have a disadvantage in producing a large number of new and
creative ideas.
Dual-process models of creativity suggest that both generative
and evaluative processes interact during the creative process
(Finke et al., 1992; Basadur, 1995; Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora,
2005; Nijstad et al., 2010; Gabora and Ranjan, 2013). Although
these models do not have a straightforward mapping onto dual-
process models of cognition, the interaction between Type 1 and
Type 2 cognitive processes may play a different role in different
phases of the creative process. In this line, Sowden et al. (2015)
call for future research “... to investigate the extent to which
creativity is determined by the ability to shift between Type 1 and
Type 2 thinking processes as a function of the circumstances and
the stage of the creative processes” (p. 55). Our results suggest that
cognitive reflection, that is the disposition to override automatic
responses related to Type 1 processing and engage in Type 2
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1626
Corgnet et al. Creativity and Cognitive Skills among Millenials
controlled thought, has a complex effect on divergent thinking.
To some extent, cognitive reflection may be necessary to shift
between the generative and evaluative processes involved in the
production of new ideas. However, individuals characterized by
high levels of reflection may be less able to rely on their intuitive,
autonomous mind which can also be needed for unleashing one’s
creative power (e.g., Dorfman et al., 1996; Norris and Epstein,
2011; Jarosz et al., 2012).
The finding of an inverted U-shape relationship between
cognitive reflection (and, analogously, intuitive processing) and
creativity is consistent with recent advances on the “mad genius
hypothesis”: mild levels of top-down control dysfunction may
be beneficial for creativity but severe impairment leads to poor
creative performance (for a review, see Abraham, 2014).
Relatedly, neuropsychological research has shown an
inverted-U shape relationship between spontaneous eye
blink rates and flexibility in divergent creative thinking tasks
(Chermahini and Hommel, 2010). To the extent that eye blink
rates reflect dopaminergic activity (Karson, 1983), which is in
turn linked to inhibitory control (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber,
1992), our results are in line with the finding of Chermahini and
Hommel (2010).
Beyond its connection to basic cognitive research, our findings
offer insights to managers in search for the creative talent
of millennials. One essential implication of our study is that
thinking too much may hamper important aspects of divergent
creative thinking. This result is of primary relevance to hiring
managers who may want to rely on cognitive reflection as the
main criterion to recruit diligent (Corgnet et al., 2015b) and
creative millennials. Our findings suggest that the cognitive tests
used to recruit workers have to be adapted to the nature of the
job offered. For example, recruiting for jobs that fundamentally
require finding well-defined solutions to problems (such as
accounting or actuarial jobs) can rely on a mix of cognitive ability
and reflection tests which are good predictors of convergent
creative thinking and diligence. However, recruiting for jobs that
mainly require divergent creative thinking (such as marketing,
industrial design, or psychology jobs) should not solely rely
on cognitive measures. Recruiting based on cognitive reflection
skills may actually prevent the hire of highly creative workers.
These recommendations are becoming increasingly relevant as a
growing number of jobs in modern economies require divergent
creative thinking (Pink, 2005).
The current research has some necessary limitations that
future research might remedy. To keep focus our study uses
only one measure of fluid intelligence (Raven) and a single
measure of cognitive style (CRT). Future research may assess
the robustness of our findings to other measures of fluid
intelligence and cognitive style, possibly extending the analysis
to include crystallized intelligence. Also, our sample consisted
entirely of undergraduates, with a limited age, education, and
income range. Although this was a methodological choice
that allowed us to study the workforce of the future, further
studies may assess the robustness of our findings to different
populations. Regarding our creativity measures, future research
may attempt to extend our analysis to the case of practical
creative tasks that are commonly encountered, for example, at the
workplace. To that end, future research may embed the study of
creativity in an organizational setting that allows for studying the
relationship between workplace problem solving and cognitive
skills.
On a methodological note, we used a fixed ordering of
which may have influenced the results as, among other factors,
fatigue may interfere with test results. While the 2-min break
in the middle of the experiment might have mitigated spillover
effects between the first and the second part of the experiment,
concerns still remain. We encourage future research to explore
possible ordering effects. In addition, future research focusing
on state-level analyses of the role of intuition vs. reflection
in creative performance is necessary to assess the robustness
(and causality) of our trait-level findings as well as deepen
our understanding of the cognitive basis of creativity. Along
these lines, it would be interesting for future research to test
the effect of cognitive manipulations such as cognitive load,
ego depletion, priming, or time pressure/delay on creative
performance. Our findings suggest that future research on the
topic should attempt to capture potentially non-linear effects
thus elaborating experimental designs that allow such effects to
materialize. This can be done, for example, by considering at least
three levels per treatment condition.
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